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Counterpoint: The Insurance Institute for
Highway Safety Study Actually Found Cities
Using Red Light Cameras Had Higher Red
Light Running Fatality Rates
Barbara Langland-Orban, PhD, Etienne E. Pracht, PhD, John T. Large, PhD
ABSTRACT
In February 2011, the Insurance Institute for Highway Safety (IIHS) disseminated their research study that compared red
light running traffic fatality rates between cities that implemented red light camera (RLC) programs with cities that did not.
The IIHS researchers concluded cities that used RLCs had a significantly larger percentage reduction in both red light
running (RLR) fatality rates and total fatality rates at signalized intersections. Because a previous IIHS study on RLCs was
found to use flawed research methods, as well as to incorrectly report findings, the current IIHS RLC analysis is reviewed for
adherence to scientific methods. Our review reveals the 2011 IIHS study is logically flawed and violates basic scientific
research methods that are required for a study’s findings to be valid. It has neither internal nor external validity. More
importantly, the IIHS did not fully explain the results of its analysis. Correctly interpreting its model’s results actually shows
that cities using RLCs had an estimated higher rate of red light running fatalities, specifically 25%, than cities that did not
use RLCs in the period “after” cameras were used. Further, the IIHS study was only able to make statements suggesting
favorable results from the use of RLCs due to the biased selection of sampled cities. The red light running fatality rate as well
as the total fatality rate at all signalized intersections in cities that used cameras was higher in both the “before” and “after”
time periods, which affirms that superior interventions exist. Also, we explain the IIHS’ financial conflict of interest regarding
photo enforcement.
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Background
In February 2011, the Insurance Institute for
Highway Safety (IIHS) disseminated their study that
concluded cities with red light camera (RLC)
programs experienced a greater percent reduction in
their red light running (RLR) fatality rate and, to a
lesser extent, in their total fatality rate at signalized
intersections, relative to cities that did not
implement RLC programs (Hu, McCartt, & Teoh,
2011). In contrast to this IIHS conclusion,
Langland-Orban, Large and Pracht (2011) published
an analysis that summarized studies identified as the
best designed RLC research in a National Highway
Traffic
Safety
Administration
(NHTSA)
compendium (Decina et al, 2007). Most of these
studies found that fatalities at RLC sites occurred in
larger number than at comparison sites, thereby
yielding conclusions directly contrary to the 2011
IIHS study. A major difference is that the studies,
classified as best designed, had evaluated actual RLC
sites and adjusted for traffic volume, whereas the
IIHS study analyzed city-wide data, not specific to
camera sites.
The controversy surrounding RLCs was
disclosed in the Office of the Majority Leader’s
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Report (2001) entitled The Red Light Running Crisis:
Is It Intentional? The report explained that when
yellow light timings are correctly set at
intersections, red light running is a relatively
infrequent occurrence. However, for RLC programs
to be profitable, it is necessary to shorten yellow
light timings to create a larger “dilemma zone”
where drivers cannot stop in time and hence receive
a ticket for entering the intersection on a red light.
Further, RLCs can encourage drivers to stop
abruptly in attempts to avoid a ticket, which is a
hazardous driving action that is known to increase
rear end crashes. The Majority Leader’s Report also
explained that, in 1994, the Institute of
Transportation Engineers (ITE) recommended that
when red light running is a problem at an
intersection, the yellow light timing can be
lengthened
(the
prevailing
standard),
or
alternatively, enforcement (tickets) can be used (a
new provision). This change to permit enforcement
was endorsed by the Federal Highway
Administration in 2000, which allows for creating
“dilemma zones” at signalized intersections that are
associated with red light running and thus increase
RLC tickets.
Because the IIHS findings on the association
between RLCs and fatalities is contrary to the RLC
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studies classified as best designed in the NHTSA
compendium, the 2011 IIHS study is reviewed here
for adherence to basic research methods, which are
required for valid conclusions to be drawn. It should
be noted that a previous IIHS study on RLCs
(Retting & Kyrychenko, 2002) was found to have
used flawed research methods, as well as to
incorrectly report findings, rendering the findings
invalid (Burkey & Obeng, 2004; Large, Orban, &
Pracht, 2008). In addition, the IIHS financial conflict
of interest regarding photo enforcement is
explained.
Critique of the IIHS Methods
The IIHS analysis included 14 cities that used
camera programs and compared them with 48 cities
that did not. The “before period” was defined as the
combined years of 1992–1996 when none of the 62
cities had cameras. The “after period” was defined as
the years 2004–2008. The 14 “camera” cities were
reported to have used RLCs at some sites
throughout this five-year period, whereas the 48
comparison cities never used RLCs.
The IIHS study developed two Poisson
regression models. The first model, reportedly, used
red light running (RLR) fatalities per 100,000population as the outcome measure (dependent and
continuous variable). The second model reportedly
used fatalities per 100,000-population at signalized
intersections (also a continuous variable). The use of
the word “reportedly” is explained below in facts 4
and 5. The determinants (independent variables)
used to estimate each outcome were as follows:
• Land area in square miles
• Thousands of persons (population) per
square mile
• “After” camera period (0 = 1992-1996; 1 =
2004-2008)
• Camera cities (0 = never used cameras; 1 =
cameras in 2004-2008)
• Interaction between “after” camera period
and camera cities
Five facts are immediately apparent about the
research design, which jeopardize the internal and
external validity of their findings.
(1) The Poisson regression models excluded
variables (determinants) known to be
associated with traffic fatalities, such as
changes in public policies or engineering
improvements made during or between the
study periods. For example, some states,
e.g., Florida, repealed their motorcycle
helmet law between the two time periods,
which was associated with increased
fatalities. It is noteworthy that the Federal
Highway Administration’s RLC study
(Council et al., 2005) suggested that
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fatalities should be ignored in RLC analyses
because they are an infrequent outcome and
result from issues associated with “occupant
age, restraint use, and the type and size of
vehicles involved.” The IIHS study likewise
did not consider these FHWA-cited factors,
which are associated with fatalities. By
excluding factors known to be associated
with fatalities, the IIHS study likely suffers
from omitted variables bias (i.e., underspecification). Unless the excluded variables
were statistically independent from those
that were included, the influence of the
former will be, incorrectly, attributed to the
latter.
(2) Two of their explanatory variables (“land
area” and “persons per square mile”) are not
established factors associated with motor
vehicle crashes or fatalities and have not
been used in other RLC research. Whereas
variable selection is to some extent
subjective, a clear theoretical explanation
for a variable’s inclusion must be provided.
If no theoretical basis exists for including
variables, they should be left out of the
model since their inclusion can alter
(distort) the findings. This is especially true
because the authors found no statistical
significance for these factors.
(3) Assuming that the dependent variable for
each model is defined as reported, some
variables are included more than one time,
making them redundant. For example,
population is the denominator in both
outcome measures reported (e.g., fatalities
per 100,000-population), as well as a
numerator in the variable “population per
square mile.” Further, land density is an
independent variable and is also used in a
second independent variable “population
per square mile.” This introduces the
problem of multi-collinearity, meaning
variables used in the model are highly
correlated and coefficient estimates, such as
the association between cameras and
fatalities, can be inaccurate as a
consequence.
(4) The authors report their dependent
variables as rates (e.g., fatalities per
100,000-population), which are defined as
continuous. They then proceed with
Poisson regression which is designed for
count data (not rates). If these first four
points appear confusing, it stems from the
authors’ erroneous use of variables and
descriptions. The review will proceed
assuming that the dependent variables were
actual counts.
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(5) If the use of a Poisson regression is
appropriate and the dependent variable is
indeed a discrete number (i.e., count data)
then the correct interpretation of the
estimated coefficients is “a change in the
number of fatalities, holding the population
density and land area constant.” This is, of
course, qualitatively and quantitatively
different from a percentage change in the rate
of such fatalities. Examination of the
“before” camera period data illustrates the
importance of this distinction. About 93% of
all camera cities had at least seven fatal
RLR accidents in the 1992-1996 period,
with most having substantially higher
numbers. In contrast, 56% of the noncamera cities had six or fewer RLR
fatalities. The authors of the IIHS study
ignored the fact that the non-camera cities
had substantially fewer RLR related
fatalities in the “before” period, when
cameras were not used in any of the 62
studied cities. Of even greater impact, 23%
of the non-camera cities had two or fewer
(including zero) such accidents. Because no
city can improve its fatality rate if it is
already zero, the simple fact is that the
“number” in particular, and by extension
the “percentage change in the rate,” of
fatalities had much less room for
improvement in the non-camera cities.
Review of the IIHS Findings
Ignoring the obvious problem relating to the
use of “percentage change in rate” as discussed
above, the following provides a more detailed review
of the results and interpretations. Table 1 provides a
portion of Table 1 from the IIHS results. The IIHS
reported that cities using RLCs had a larger percent
reduction in red light running fatality rates. This
misrepresents their findings. Cities that used RLCs
had a substantially higher rate of red light running
fatalities in both time periods, “before” and “after”
camera use, relative to cities that did not use RLCs
(point 5). Similarly, cities that used RLCs had a
higher fatality rate at signalized intersections than
cities that did not use them, in both time periods.
Cities starting from a higher absolute base can show
greater relative improvement than those already
performing well, even in the absence of an
intervention, hence the larger percentage rate
change in the “camera cities.”
Table 1 also reveals that the IIHS method for
selecting comparison cities violated research
methods since the comparison cities (no RLC use)
averaged much lower fatality rates in the “before”
period, relative to camera cities. Scientific research
methods require that the comparison group is
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selected to be similar to the treated group, in this
case “camera cities.” The fact that the two groups
have a large difference in fatality rates in the
“before” period reflects bias in the selection of the
comparison group, which jeopardizes the validity of
the findings (Campbell & Stanley, 1963).
Further, the IIHS included cities that had
extreme fatality rates. Extreme rates, whether high
or low, may regress toward the mean (the average)
absent any intervention, meaning high rates may fall
over time while low rates may rise. Extreme rates
may also indicate the presence of factors that are
unique to the particular observations. For example,
within the context of the IIHS study, an extremely
high rate in a particular city may be explained by
yellow light intervals that are systematically shorter
on average compared to the remaining cities in the
analysis.
Scientific research methods allow for including
sites with extreme rates; however, the comparison
sites must be selected to be similarly extreme,
whether high or low (Campbell & Stanley, 1963).
Instead, the extremes are dissimilar because 26
(54%) of the 48 comparison (no-camera) cities have
RLR fatality rates per 100,000 population that were
less than 0.4 in the “before” period; two of which had
a rate of zero, making a reduction impossible. In
contrast, only one of the 14 cities using cameras
(7%) had a rate less than 0.4.
A specific case in point of an extreme was
Phoenix, a camera city. Its status as an outlier is
illustrated by the fact that it had an RLR fatality
rate of 1.82 per 100,000 population in the “before”
period, which is almost four standard deviations
above the average of the sample. The Phoenix rate
declined to 1.01 in the “after” period. The inclusion
of Phoenix reflects further selection bias due to its
extremely high fatality rate, which is then compared
with cities that already have low fatality rates and
then ultimately reporting the findings as percent
changes only. According to the IIHS study results,
Phoenix had a 45% decrease in its red light running
fatality rate. It is noteworthy that the average
“before” rate in the non-camera cities was 0.4, or,
stated differently, the Phoenix “before” period rate
was over 300% higher compared to the non-camera
city average. Given its starting position, interpreting
a 45% decrease as evidence of RLC effectiveness is
faulty because the fatality rate of 1.01 in the “after”
period is still extraordinarily high and 2.7 standard
deviations higher than the sample average.
The dynamic of bias described above permeates
the interpretation of the regression results as
revealed in Table 2, which replicates Table 2 from
the IIHS study, reporting the results from their
statistical analysis of RLR fatalities per 100,000
population.
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The IIHS researchers wrote the following about
the cities: “The rate of fatal red light running crashes
between 1992-96 and 2004-08 was reduced by an
estimated 16 percent ([exp(-0.1709)-1]×100) for cities
without camera programs and by an estimated 36 percent
([exp(-0.1709-0.2809)-1]×100) for cities with
cameras.” This is a favorable presentation of the
findings, but distorts actual results because the
authors excluded the estimate for the “camera cities”
variable, which is both large and positive.
Table 3 presents our interpretation of their
results and summarizes the percent differences,
estimated relative to the base case. The base case is
the “before” period in cities not using cameras. Thus,
cities using cameras had an estimated 65% higher
rate of red light running fatalities in the “before”
period. This extreme starting position undoubtedly
impacts the ending position. Cities not using
cameras had an estimated 16% decrease in the RLR
fatality rate in the “after” period, despite the fact that
some started with a rate of absolute zero. Both of
these findings are, nonetheless, correctly reported in
the IIHS report. However, cities that used cameras
had an estimated 5% higher fatality rate in the
“after” period relative to the base case, a finding not
reported by the IIHS researchers, albeit this
difference is unlikely to be statistically significant.
The important question is what was the
difference between cities using vs. not using cameras
in the “after” camera period? The “after” period
estimate (-0.17) is the same for both groups. Thus,
the difference between the two groups is the “cities
with cameras” estimate (0.4998) plus the
“interaction” estimate (-0.28). Thus, cities using
cameras are estimated to have a 25% higher red light
running fatality rate [(EXP(0.4998-0.28))-1] in the
“after” period relative to cities not using cameras,
despite the greater reported percent reduction in the
former. The authors’ incorrect conclusions were
based on the interaction effect only and not the
result from both the main effect (cities with cameras)
and the interaction effect.
Understanding the IIHS Conflict of Interest
The IIHS is supported and funded by
automobile insurance companies and associations,
and their financial interest in traffic tickets and
ambivalence toward lowering crash costs were
explained nearly 50 years ago by Ralph Nader, an
expert on traffic safety. In Nader’s landmark book,
Unsafe at Any Speed: The Designed in Dangers of the
American Automobile, a chapter titled “The traffic
safety establishment: Damn the driver and spare the car,”
explained the IIHS interests. Nader (1965) described
the IIHS as part of a private “traffic safety
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establishment,” which was focused on defending
business interests and profits, while subjugating
evidenced-based interventions that reduce injuries
and fatalities. He wrote, “Under existing business
values, potential safety advances are subordinated to other
investments, priorities, preferences, and themes designed to
maximize profit.
Nader (1965) described the private “traffic safety
establishment” as focusing exclusively on driver
behavior, instead of engineering improvements that
are associated with the prevention of crashes and
injuries. Nader explained that crashes resulting from
engineering defects of automobiles can be imputed to
drivers, which is also true of roadway engineering
defects, such as yellow light timings that are set too
short, thereby forcing red light running. Nader
explained the myopic focus of the private “traffic
safety establishment” as follows:
Today almost every program is aimed at the
driver – at educating him, exhorting him,
watching him, judging him, punishing him,
compiling records about his driving violations . .
.
Although published in 1965, this is an accurate
description of photo enforcement programs.
Nader also explained why automobile insurance
companies are ambivalent about reducing crash
costs. First, insurance companies are able to gain
approval from state regulators to raise insurance
premiums to cover higher losses, making them
indifferent about loss prevention, since increased
losses justify increased premiums, passing higher
crash costs on to drivers. Second, automobile
insurance companies earn more profit from
investment income (investing premiums collected
from drivers) than from underwriting activities.
Thus, higher premiums produce more money to
invest and hence more profit for insurance
companies.
The importance of these principles is evidenced
in the average automobile insurance rate change that
occurred nationwide in 2009. From 2004 to 2008,
the annualized rate of premium increase was about
3.2%, consistent with inflation (U.S. Department of
Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2008). In 2008,
the real estate bubble burst and the U.S. stock
market crashed, with average stock market returns
being down over 37% (Anspach, 2011). This loss
may explain the large increase in automobile
insurance premiums in 2009, which jumped by
double digits across all states. For example, average
automobile insurance rates in Florida increased by
58%, averaging $1,055 in 2008 and $1,668 in 2009
according to www.insurancelevel.com (2010) and
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Table 1. Table 1 from the IIHS Study Average Annual per capita Rates of Fatal Red Light Running Crashes and All Fatal Crashes at Signalized
Intersections for Cities with and without Red Light Camera Enforcement Programs, 1992-96 and 2004-08
14 cities with
48 cities without
camera programs
camera programs
1992-96 2004-08 Percent 1992-96 2004-08 Percent
change
change
Average annual population (million)
9.02
10.08
11.7
17.07
19.08
11.7
Average annual rate of fatal red light running 7.16
4.66
-34.9
4.79
4.10
-14.4
crashes per million population
Average annual rate of all fatal crashes at 16.38
14.02
-14.4
13.02
13.27
1.9
signalized intersections per million population

Table 2: Table 2 from the IIHS Study Poisson Model of the Effects of Red Light Camera Enforcement on Average Annual per capita Rate of
Fatal Red Light Running Crashes
Parameter
Estimate
Standard error p value
Intercept
1.7050
0.1547
<0.0001
*
Land area in square miles
0.0001
0.0003
0.6391
Population density (thousands of persons per square mile)
-0.0371
0.0191
0.0527
After period (2004-08) vs. before period (1992-96)
-0.1709
0.0678
0.0117*
Cities that implemented red light cameras vs. cities that did not 0.4998
0.1436
0.0005*
Interaction of study period and city group
-0.2809
0.1079
0.0092*

Table 3: Summary of Percent Differences
Estimate

-0.17

0.4998

-0.28

Period

Cameras

Before = 0
After = 1

No Camera = 0
Camera = 1

After & camera = 1
All other cases = 0

% Difference

Before
Before
After
After

No
Yes
No
Yes

0
0
-0.17
-0.17

0
0.4998
0
0.4998

0
0
0
-0.28

0.65
-0.16
0.05
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www.CarInsurance.com
(2011).
Thus,
auto
insurance rates jumped subsequent to insurance
company investment losses, suggesting the increase
may have occurred to achieve return on investment
expectations, and not due to a large increase in
individual risk relative to crashes and injuries.
This supports Nader’s assertion that higher
losses are simply passed on to drivers in the form of
higher premiums, as there was no large increase in
individual risk. Instead, traffic fatalities had declined.
The
National
Highway
Traffic
Safety
Administration (2010) reported that fatal crashes
declined between 2007 and 2009. For example, the
number of fatal motor vehicle traffic crashes declined
from 34,172 in 2008 to 30,797 in 2009, representing
an almost 10% drop. In addition, the rate of fatalities
per 100,000 population declined from 1.26 to 1.13.
The drop in fatalities is in accordance with the
reduction in miles traveled that followed the
recession: billions of miles traveled declined from
3,032 to 2,979 in respectively, 2007 and 2009. These
data cast serious doubt on the notion that premiums
increased in response to increased risk.
Further, automobile insurance profitability had
increased prior to 2004 after the insurance industry
developed new pricing tools in 2000. Instead of
categorizing drivers into four or five tiers for
underwriting purposes, insurance companies began
using thousands of factors to determine a driver’s
rate (Oster, 2004). A proliferation of traffic tickets,
via photo enforcement, creates a proliferation of
factors (tickets) to use in underwriting that justify
premium increases. Hence, the automobile insurance
industry has a financial interest in advocating for
photo enforcement.
Tickets can result in multi-year automobile
insurance increases from surcharges due to points on
a driver’s license and/or from underwriting
penalties. In Florida, a state insurance specialist
explained that RLC tickets can be used in
underwriting, similar to other tickets, to increase a
driver’s automobile insurance rate, even though the
tickets do not add points to a driver’s license (Rick
Lunsford, personal communication, July 29, 2011). It
was noted that practices vary among insurance
companies, such that drivers would need to contact
their own company to ascertain the percent increase
and duration (years) of any penalty from a camera
ticket.
It is not surprising that public officials can be
misinformed about the relative effectiveness of traffic
tickets and photo enforcement in reducing crashes.
Ralph Nader (1965) had also explained that the
private “traffic safety establishment” has inserted
themselves as educators to public officials and law
enforcement regarding traffic safety. He explained
that the merging of public and private funds is a
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“recurrent practice in the traffic safety establishment and
assures the participation of industry people directly in
official programs.” This continues today, as evidenced
by agendas from the Governors Highway Safety
Administration (GHSA) annual meetings. The
GHSA membership includes highway safety
representatives from each state. Insurance
companies and camera vendors participate as
associate members (Governors Highway Safety
Administration [GHSA], 2011), and IIHS
representatives and other special interests
participate as speakers. For example, in 2010, a
representative from the Partnership for Advancing
Road Safety presented “Automated Enforcement:
We’ve Got Your Number” (GHSA, 2010), which is
an organization funded by traffic camera vendors
(thenewspaper.com, 2010). Whereas free speech laws
permit such presentations, it illustrates how the
process allows proprietary interests to influence
public officials, apparently absent disclosures of
financial conflicts of interest.
Conclusions
The 2011 IIHS study actually found that cities
that used cameras had noticeably higher red light
running fatality rates than cities that did not use
cameras in both “before” and “after” time periods.
This finding was also true regarding the total
fatality rate at signalized intersections. This
suggests other interventions were more effective in
lowering fatality rates at signalized intersections.
However, the authors of the IIHS study did not cite
these findings. Further, the extremely high rates of
red light running fatalities in the “after” period in
both Phoenix (1.01 per 100,000 population) and
Bakersfield (1.06 per 100,000 population), which
used cameras, are evidence that other interventions
may prove particularly effective in these cities if ever
implemented, as comparison cities (no-camera)
averaged 0.41 per 100,000-population in the “after”
period.
Further, the impropriety of the IIHS research
approach, which uses cities as the unit of analysis
instead of RLC sites, is evidenced by the
Washington and Shin (2005) analysis of the 10 RLC
sites in Phoenix. Washington and Shin (2005)
analyzed crashes and injuries at RLC and
comparison sites in Phoenix, and adjusted for traffic
volume. They concluded: (1) total crashes did not
change at RLC sites; (2) the net safety benefit was
negligible since RLCs were not associated with
reducing injuries or fatalities; (3) spillover effects
were not found; they wrote: “the findings may suggest
motorists are aware of which approaches have cameras
and which do not;” (4) the RLC sites had a higher
percent of fatal angle crashes, relative to comparison
sites, in the “after” period; and (5) the cost of
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fatalities was excluded from the economic analysis
(meaning the negligible safety benefit that was
reported is incorrect because the higher fatal crash
costs at RLC sites were excluded from the economic
analysis). As the Washington and Shin (2005)
analysis has revealed, analyzing only RLC and
comparison sites within a community produces
contrasting results than analyzing aggregated data
from all signalized intersections within a community
(as done by the IIHS).
Meanwhile, the U.S. PIRG (2011) has published
recommendations regarding RLCs that are designed
to advance the public’s interests when government
entities consider camera programs. These
recommendations can also be used to evaluate
existing RLC programs to assess adherence and,
thereby, determine if cameras are used for public
safety or for advancing private business interests.
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